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Abstract
Cox and Posner’s landmark contribution is the first article to have
highlighted the challenges of information asymmetry in immigration
screening. While Cox and Posner have undoubtedly made a significant
contribution, there is a critical oversight in their framework: they do
not discuss the importance of targeted ex post mechanisms of
screening educational elites. This Essay is an attempt to remedy Cox
and Posner’s omission. Why is this oversight so problematic? In the
post-9/11 world, U.S. immigration policy currently finds itself on the
horns of a dilemma. While immigrant educational elites are critical to
U.S. economic growth, terrorist networks have stepped up their
recruiting among well-trained elites.
In visa application processes, screening out terrorism suspects is
notoriously complicated, in part because terrorist networks are
typically difficult for outsiders to penetrate. Yet, the same cannot be
said of elite networks. Indeed, the term “global elite” is meant to
reflect precisely the fact that a network of rich, well-educated persons
from developing countries exists, and that members of this network
are now bona fide members of the Western elite. Social network
theory tells us that these elites are typically only a few degrees of
separation apart. Yet while a primary goal of immigration law is
screening, the U.S. currently finds itself in the absurd position of
screening elite aliens utilizing what this Essay terms “insufficiently
networked” information. This screening typically occurs with little
reference to the closely-knit elite networks whence these aliens
originate, even as these networks are far better placed to access
information about their members. A primary goal of immigration law
should be to leverage these networks to supply the government with
early warning signals when U.S. visa recipients display terrorist
sympathies.
This Essay seeks to mitigate the challenges of information gathering
about such elites through an under-utilized and under-theorized
sanction, namely, visa-revocation. If not as a de jure matter, certainly
as a de facto matter, elites typically have access to U.S. immigration
privileges that are not easily available to their fellow nationals. Visas
are status-conveyers, and their loss may undermine business and
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educational opportunities dear to global elites. In a proposal referred
to in shorthand as “a visa to snitch,” I impose a “duty to snitch” on
elite visa-recipients. Each time that a visa holder commits a terrorist
act, the authorities would determine which persons in her network
knew of her terrorist sympathies and failed to report them. These
persons would face visa cancellation, or at a minimum, a reduced
prospect of visa renewal, unless they were able to demonstrate that
they had good reason not to know or not to report.
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INTRODUCTION

The legal scholarship has much to say about questions of immigrant
“type,” namely, which immigrants, among the millions who seek
entry, should be admitted to the U.S. and in what numbers. Yet, while
much has been written about these “first-order” questions, 1 the law
review literature has little to say about how the Department of
Homeland Security (“DHS”) 2 can ensure that the persons selected
actually match its “type” preferences. The scholarship has been
neglectful of “second-order” questions of institutional design. 3
A refreshing exception to this general scholarly inattention is Cox and
Posner (2007). 4 They argue that the principal institutional design
choice for any state is between ex ante screening, in which an alien is
screened on the basis of pre-entry information and denied entry if she
does not fit the state’s first-order goals and an ex post system, in which
an alien is screened on the basis of post-entry information and
deported if she does not meet first-order policy. 5 Cox and Posner’s
analysis is enormously important: it provides a compelling explanatory
framework for many puzzles in immigration law and policy, including
the astronomical increase in federal immigration prosecutions. 6 They
argue that this prosecutorial trend reflects an increasing institutional
bias for ex post as opposed to ex ante screening. 7

1

The phrase “first-order” is Cox and Posner’s. See Adam B. Cox & Eric A.
Posner, The Second-Order Structure of Immigration Law, 59 STAN. L. REV. 809, 810
(2007). For a response, see Hiroshi Motomura, Comment, Choosing Immigrants,
Making Citizens, 59 STAN. L. REV. 857 (2007).
2
In the aftermath of September 11, the Federal government was re-organized
to create the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”). DHS now houses
Immigration and Customs Enforcement (“ICE”), which bears primary responsibility
for the federal immigration enforcement function. For a discussion of how DHS was
organized to accommodate ICE, see STEPHEN H. LEGOMSKY AND CRISTINA M.
RODRIGUEZ, IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE LAW AND POLICY, Ch. 1 (2009).
3
This scholarly neglect is also briefly discussed in a previous contribution by
the author. Eleanor Brown, Outsourcing Immigration Compliance, 77 FORDHAM L.
REV. 2475 (2009).
4
See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811.
5
Id.
6
See infra notes 88-89 and accompanying text
7
See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813.
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Why this ex post bias? A primary reason offered by Cox and Posner is
information asymmetry. 8 Even as Congress dictates particular typepreferences, the government is generally not well placed to collect and
screen information about potential migrants. For example, a potential
migrant will generally know much more about herself, and whether
she will abide by U.S. immigration laws, than a consular visa-officer. 9
Post-entry screening mitigates the challenges of information
asymmetry since the U.S. is better able to access and screen
information about aliens once they are already in the country.10 Herein
lies the primary explanation for the post-entry bias: given minimal
access to reliable pre-entry information, DHS expends significant
resources “double-checking” that only the right “types” have been
admitted to the U.S. and ferreting out and deporting the “wrong”
types, particularly among low-skilled aliens who are often unable to
provide reliable pre entry documentation. 11
Post 9/11, there is evidence that the U.S. has also invested significant
resources in ferreting out and deporting the “wrong types” even among
members of the global elite, 12 namely, the group of persons who

8
For a general summary of the challenges of information asymmetry,
particularly in the context of contracting, see Introduction to PATRICK BOLTON &
MATHIAS DEWATRIPONT, CONTRACT THEORY (2005). For a broader discussion of ex
ante versus ex post approaches to regulation, partly because of information
asymmetry, see, e.g., STEVEN SHAVELL, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF ACCIDENT Law
277-80 (1987). Cox and Posner’s primary focus is on mechanisms of screening
immigrants (that is, persons who are admitted for long-term residence and possibly
citizenship). For broader reflections on the applications of economic principles to
immigration law including the admission of short-term guests, see generally,
Michael J. Trebilcock, Immigration Policy, in PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 259 (Peter Newman ed., 1998); Michael J. Trebilcock,
The Law and Economics of Immigration Policy, 5 AM. LAW & ECON. REV. 271
(2003); Michael J. Trebilcock and Matthew Sudak, The Political Economy of
Emigration and Immigration, 81 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 234 (2006).
9
Consular officers are State Department employees stationed in Embassies
overseas. They are typically the “on the ground” screeners of visa applications. For a
general discussion of their role see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2, Chapter
1 (2009).
10
See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813.
11
Id.
12
The new emphasis on federal screening of elites is discussed in Philip
Shandon, In the Wake of the Times Square Bomb Case, the Feds Just Issued a
Chilling Warning to Pakistani Leaders: Check Your Family and Staff for Terrorist
Ties, THE DAILY BEAST (May 21, 2010, 9:47 AM),
http://www.thedailybeast.com/blogs-and-stories/2010-05-21/faisal-shahzad-case-
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occupy the apex of their social order, attend the same coterie of
Western universities, and work and reside within one degree of
separation of their fellow elites in their countries of origin. 13 DHS
appears to have been particularly focused on post-entry screening of
elites with scientific credentials such as engineers. 14 The information
asymmetry rationale has less explanatory power with respect to elite
migrants, since issues of information collection and verification are
less acute. 15 In contrast to their-low skilled counterparts, elites are
well-placed to provide tangible proxies that they will be productive
and well-behaved (such as professional certifications). Moreover,
given modern advances in information technology, these proxies may
be easily verified even halfway across the globe.
Even as they are generally agnostic on U.S. institutional design
choices, Cox and Posner emphasize the reduced explanatory power of
the information asymmetry rationale in this context and appear
troubled by the disproportionate focus on post-entry screening among

spurs-feds-to-warn-pakistans-leaders-check-your-families-for-terrorism-ties/. See
also infra notes 63-67 and accompanying text.
13
See generally P. BOURDIEU, THE STATE NOBILITY: ELITE SCHOOLS IN THE
FIELD OF POWER (1996) (for a classic sociological utilization of the term “elite.”)
See also JANINE WEDEL, SHADOW ELITE (2009) for a contemporary utilization of the
term, which is generally used to refer to a small group of people who control a
disproportionate amount of wealth, privilege, and access to decision-making. A
recent issue of The Economist also discusses the extraordinary influence of these
elites, with a particular focus on elites in the developing world. See The Rich and
The Rest: A Special Report on the Global Elite. THE ECONOMIST, 58, Jan. 22, 2011.
In social science circles, the term “elite” has long associated with Marx scholars. See
generally, T.B. BOTTOMORE, ELITES AND SOCIETY (1964). However, the term has
long had broader currency shorn of Marxist connotations, and there have been
several landmark studies of economic, political, academic and cultural elites,
primarily in the “West” but also more broadly. See generally, C. WRIGHT MILLS,
THE POWER ELITE (1956); FLOYD HUNTER, COMMUNITY POWER STRUCTURE: A
STUDY OF DECISION MAKERS (1953); M. SCHWARTZ, THE STRUCTURE OF POWER IN
AMERICA: THE CORPORATE ELITE AS RULING CLASS (1987); G. WILLIAM
DORNHOFF, WHO RULES AMERICA? (1967); ROBERT PUTNAM, A COMPARATIVE
STUDY OF POLITICAL ELITES (1976) (all containing detailed anthropological,
sociological or political science studies of how elites function).
14
Cox and Posner use the term “highly skilled.” I will utilize this term
interchangeably with “educational elites.”
15
See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 825.
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educational elites. 16 What is the source of their discomfort? For elites
in particular, the economic stakes of institutional design choices
appear to be high. Why so? There is a real risk that highly talented but
risk-averse persons may be deterred from migrating to the U.S. The
economic data is unambiguous: the U.S. economy needs educational
elites. 17 Microsoft Founder Bill Gates has famously pointed out that
Google, Oracle, and Intel were all founded by immigrant computer
scientists. 18 Notably, the Blackberry smart phone was also invented by
immigrants – in Canada rather than the United States. 19 Gates
contends that the U.S. is falling behind in the competitive race for
global talent due partly to an anachronistic immigration system. Cox
and Posner appear sensitive to these concerns and are disinclined to
augment these challenges. 20 Thus, in the context of the highly skilled,
they seem to express a preference for ex ante screening. 21
Cox and Posner have undoubtedly made a significant contribution;
they are the only scholars to have weighed the comparative advantages
of ex ante versus ex post approaches. Yet, there is a critical oversight
in their framework: they do not discuss the importance of targeted ex
post mechanisms of screening the highly skilled. Why is this
problematic? While elite immigrants are clearly critical for U.S.
economic growth, terrorist networks have also stepped up their
recruiting among such elites. Among the many aspirants to global
notoriety as bombers, it is the elite and well-educated that are most
16

Id. Motomura also seems to share a similar concern. See Motomura, supra
note 1 at 869 (noting that "lessons in Second-Order Structure about ex post screening
are less convincing for noncitizens who are lawfully in the United States, and
especially unconvincing for permanent residents.").
17
See infra text accompanying notes.
18
Bill Gates testimony is summarized in Miriam Jordan, Skilled Worker Visa
Applicants Expected to Soar, WALL ST. J. Mar., 31 2008 at A2. Before the H.
Comm. On Science and Technology (statement of William H. Gates, Chairman,
Microsoft), available at
http://www.microsoft.com/presspass/exec/billg/speeches/2008/congress.mspx
19
The invention of the Blackberry smart phone in Canada is discussed in
THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT: A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE TWENTY FIRST
CENTURY (2007).
20
I should point out that Cox and Posner do not specifically mention Gates’
testimony. However, they clearly share a similar concern. See Cox & Posner, supra
note 1, at 813.
21
Id.

8

likely to be chosen by Al Qaeda’s leadership. 22 Indeed Al Qaeda’s
own leadership has been populated by such elites. 23 Among recent
terror attempts, the most highly publicized was that of the Pakistani
would-be Times Square bomber, Faisal Shahzad, who was previously
a recipient of elite student and professional visas and was undoubtedly
a member of the global elite. 24 Profiles of famous terrorism suspects
reveal this theme repeating itself. 25 Moreover there is another critical
omission in Cox and Posner’s analysis: ex ante screening is
complicated because elites have resources which allow them to
obscure “red flags.” Additionally, some persons undergo extreme
radicalization only after they receive their visas. For such subjects, ex
ante screening would hardly suffice; ex post screening is critical.
Indeed, this was one of the justifications offered for the FBI’s largescale questioning of students and scientists of Middle Eastern origin
after 9/11. Although the FBI’s dragnet has generally withstood
judicial review, 26 such action is arguably ineffective. There needs to
22

Richard Bernstein, Letter from America, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 30, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/31/us/31iht-letter.html.
23
Id. Several members of Al Qaeda’s current leadership originate from such
backgrounds. Most famously, Osama Bin Laden is the son of a monied and
influential Saudi contractor. His deputy, Ayman al-Zawahri is a doctor from an
affluent and prominent Egyptian family, with several distinguished academics.
24
At the time of the attack, Shahzad was a naturalized American citizen.
However, prior to naturalization he had been the recipient of several visas, including
an F1 student visa to study at an American university and a highly selective H1B
visa for skilled foreign nationals.
Faisal Shahzad, Times Topics,
http://topics.nytimes.com/top/reference/timestopics/people/s/faisal_shahzad/index.ht
ml?scp=1&sq=Shahzad%20&st=cse (last visited Jan. 17, 2011). While Shahzad had
recently fallen on hard times, by virtue of his advantages of birth and Western
education, he was undoubtedly a member of the global elite.
25
Bernstein, supra note 22; Andrew Sullivan makes a similar point in his
Atlantic Monthly blog. See Andrew Sullivan, A Very Bourgeois Would-Be Bomber,
THE ATLANTIC MONTHLY: THE DAILY DISH, (Dec. 29, 2009, 10:53 AM),
http://andrewsullivan.theatlantic.com/the_daily_dish/2009/12/a-very-bourgeoiswouldbe-bomber.html.
26
A summary of the outcome of legal challenges to the FBI’s post 9/11 dragnet of
student visa-recipients of Middle Eastern origin and Muslims more generally, is
included in MUZAFFAR A. CHISHTI ET AL., MIGRATION POLICY INSTITUTE,
AMERICA'S CHALLENGE: DOMESTIC SECURITY, CIVIL LIBERTIES, AND NATIONAL
UNITY AFTER SEPTEMBER 11, AT 7-14 (2003). See also U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, THE
SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES: A REVIEW (2003); U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE,
SUPPLEMENTAL REPORT ON SEPTEMBER 11 DETAINEES (2003).
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be a narrow and targeted mechanism of double-checking that elite
aliens meet U.S. type preferences. This Essay offers one such
mechanism. Congress should leverage highly desirable visas to elicit
valuable information about potential terrorists. To accomplish this
goal, it should impose an explicit requirement on certain U.S. visa
holders to inform on family and friends who may harbor fanatically
dangerous hatred of America – or risk losing their highly coveted
access to the U.S. I will refer to this proposal in shorthand as “a visa to
snitch.”
Notably, several of Shahzad’s family and friends, including his father
– a retired high ranking Pakistani military officer - noticed his extreme
radicalism. 27 And yet no one among Pakistani elites – presumably
with U.S. visas and ready access to both Pakistani and U.S. law
enforcement – appears to have snitched. 28 Consider the contrasting
behavior of the father of the “Underwear Bomber,” 29 Umar Farouk
27

The question of what precisely constitutes Islamic fundamentalism is a
controversial one. In “Western” public political discourse, the phrase has come to be
used interchangeably with Islamicism and generally refers to the group of religious
ideologies advocating a return to the “fundamentals” of Islam as embodied in the
Quran (the holy book) and the Sunnah (the practices of the Prophet Muhammed).
See generally, GRAHAM FULLER, THE FUTURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM (2003); OLIVIER
ROY, FAILURE OF POLITICAL ISLAM (1994). Central tenets include the obligation of
Muslims to obey sharia (Islamic law); pan-Islamic political unity; and the removal of
non-Muslim (particularly Western) political, cultural and military influences from
the Muslim world. Yet others indicate that Islamicism has been erroneously
conflated with fundamentalism. They argue that it consists of a continuum of more
fluid ideologies that emphasize Muslim identity, authenticity, the unity of Muslim
peoples, and the general revitalization of Muslim community. See generally, FRED
HALLIDAY, ISLAM AND THE MYTH OF CONFRONTATION (1996); JOHN ESPOSITO,
VOICES OF RESURGENT ISLAM (1983).
28
Since then there have been media reports that several other well-heeled
Pakistanis – including some with U.S. visas - are well-known among Pakistani elites
to harbor terrorist sympathies. Yet, this information is not being shared with U.S.
intelligence. See Philip Shandon, supra note 12.
29
The bomb-making materials were concealed in Abdulmutallab’s underwear,
which accounts for the would-be bomber’s popular name. Anahad O'Connor and
Eric Schmitt, Terror Attempt Seen as Man Tries to Ignite Device on Jet, N.Y. TIMES,
Dec. 26, 2009 at A1; James Sturcke, Flight Terror Suspect Abdulmutallab Charged
With Trying to Blow Up Jet, GUARDIAN UK, Dec. 27, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/27/us-terror-flight-abdulmutallabcharged; Kathleen Gray and Christina Hall, Attempted Attack Raises Airport Security
FREE
PRESS,
Dec.
16,
2009,
Concerns,
DET.
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Abdul Mutallab (“Abdulmutallab”), 30 a prosperous Nigerian
engineering student and a repeated recipient of multi-entry, multi-year
U.S. vistors’ visas. 31 As a well-known banker and philanthropist,
Father Mutallab was undoubtedly a member of the global elite and
was also a recipient of a multi-year, multi-entry U.S. visitors’ visa.
(henceforth “Umarmutallab”).32 He repeatedly alerted the American
authorities to his son’s trips to Yemen, an atypical destination for a
member of Nigeria’s jet-setting elite. 33 This was a rare red flag. 34
Parents generally do not turn in their children. 35
Notably, Umarmutallab, was the only one to report his son 36 – though
as appears to be the case with Shahzad, a much broader circle noticed
young Mutallab’s disturbing radicalism. 37 In one sense, this is
http://www.freep.com/print/article/20091226/NEWS05/91226035/Attempted-attackraises-airport-security-concerns
30
In particular, at the time of the attempted terrorist attack, he had a multipleentry, multiple-year visitor’s visa (also known as the B-2 visa). Duncan Gardham,
Stephen Adams & Martin Evans, Detroit Terror Attack Profile of Abdulmutallab,
TELEGRAPH,
Dec.
28,
2009,
DAILY
http://www.telegraph.co.uk/news/uknews/terrorism-in-the-uk/6896128/Detroitterror-attack-profile-of-Umar-Farouk-Abdul-Mutallab.html. (referring to trips to
both the U.S. and the European Union and implying that he received several visas
from these jurisdictions to travel).
31
See Adam Nossiter, Lonely Trek to Radicalism for Terrorism Suspect, N.Y.
Jan.
16,
2010,
TIMES,
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/17/world/africa/17abdulmutallab.html?pagewante
d=3.
32
Id.
33
This point has been made by several commentators including prominently
by Adam Cohen, the chief legal correspondent at the Atlantic Monthly, in his blog.
See
his
Dec.
30,
2009
posting,
http://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archive/2010/01/why-heads-should-roll/33175/.
34
Maureen Dowd, the New York Times op-ed writer was one such
commentator. Maureen Dowd, Captain Obvious Learns the Limits of Cool, N.Y.
TIMES, Jan. 9, 2010, http://www.nytimes.com/2010/01/10/opinion/10dowd.html.
The prominent blogger, Andrew Cohen, cites several opinion leaders expressing this
view. Cohen, supra note 33.
35
Dowd makes precisely this point, supra note 34. Dan Markel, Jennifer M.
Collins, and Ethan J. Leib also discuss the difficulties inherent in the decision of
whether to inform on a family member in Criminal Justice and the Challenge of
Family Ties, 1147 U. ILL. L. REV. (2007).
36
Id.
37
Id. Indeed, media reports were filled with stories from Nigerians of similar
social station who knew Abdulmutallab and his family, discussing signs of his
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unremarkable; many societies have a metaphorical equivalent of the
biblical Judas Iscariot narrative, 38 signifying a deep aversion towards
“snitches.” 39 But against this prevailing wisdom — and despite the
perceived damage snitching could do to his son, his family, his
community, and his country — the interests of the elder Mutallab and
the U.S. converged. Father Mutallab, a paradigmatic member of the
Nigerian Muslim elite, assumed the classic role of “snitch” and turned
in his son. Hence the subject of this Essay: How do we create
incentives for elites to snitch on one another? By articulating a duty to
snitch, the U.S. would essentially be codifying the behavior of the
elder Mutallab.
What do I mean by a duty to snitch? This proposal is not concerned
with criminal sanctions. 40 Rather, it is concerned with another under-

increasing radicalism, while simultaneously expressing shock that one of their own
could have engaged in a terrorist attack. Mary Chapman, Shocked Nigerians Express
Fears of Guilt By Association After Arrest, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 29, 2009,
http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/30/us/30detroit.html?_r=1;
38
Judas Iscariot famously “snitched” on Jesus. Matthew 27:3-8 (King James
Bible). Natapoff notes the universality of the Judas narrative. Alexandra Natapoff,
Snitching: the Institutional and Communal Consequences, 73 U. CINN. L. REV. 645,
650 (2005).
39
This antipathy appears to be particularly strong towards cooperation with
the U.S. government, given the deep ambivalence among many Muslim elites, about
U.S. foreign policy. Given the controversy attending U.S. policy towards “the
Muslim world,” recent polling data has captured a deep distrust among Muslim
populations towards U.S. foreign policy. Although notably President Obama
appears to be more popular in the Muslim world than President Bush, this distrust
persisted even after President Obama assumed office in virtually all Muslim
countries. See Pew Global Attitude Project, which tracks attitudes towards the U.S.
in Muslim countries. PEW GLOBAL ATTITUDES PROJECT, 2009, CONFIDENCE IN
OBAMA LIFTS U.S. IMAGE AROUND THE WORLD: MOST MUSLIM PUBLICS NOT SO
EASILY MOVED, http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264. In this
respect, Nigeria appears to be an outlier. Although approximately half of the
population is Muslim, a majority of Nigerians expressed positive views of the U.S.
even during the Bush administration, whose policies were often controversial. Since
the advent of the Obama administration, a poll in 2009 revealed that nearly 90% of
Nigerians expressed positive attitudes towards the U.S. See summary Pew poll of
Nigerian attitudes to the U.S, Confidence in Obama Lifts U.S. Image Around the
World
(July
23,
2009),
available
at
http://pewglobal.org/reports/display.php?ReportID=264.
40
The U.S. could hardly impose criminal sanctions on a foreigner overseas for
a failure to snitch. Indeed, given longstanding criminal law principles, it is doubtful
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utilized and under-theorized sanction, namely, visa-revocation. Elites
value their U.S. market access and the revocation of such access is a
serious sanction. Under this proposal, each time that a visa holder
commits a terrorist act, the authorities would determine which persons
in her network knew of her tendencies and failed to report them.
These persons would face visa cancellation, or at a minimum, a
reduced prospect of visa renewal, unless they were able to demonstrate
that they had good reason not to know or not to report.
This Essay is deliberately provocative. Even in the absence of
criminal sanctions, the imposition of a duty to “snitch” rightly causes
discomfort. It has a bad odor about it, recalling an earlier Cold War
era when aliens had their visas revoked for suspected Communist
associations (as demonstrated by their refusal to snitch on suspected
American communist associates) and raising uncomfortable First
Amendment questions. 41 For this reason, even with technical fixes, the
proposal may not only be un-implementable but also undesirable. It
bears emphasis: the point of this Essay is not to offer a feasible
proposal, but instead to throw a metaphorical bomb and to raise
uncomfortable “what if” questions. 42 In so doing, I hope to provoke
the sort of response that might typically be elicited by a thought
experiment and to cause readers to think more deeply about the power
of association to expose valuable information.
Part I includes a more detailed discussion of Cox and Posner. In Part
II, I focus on my primary subject, Abdulmutallab, assembling a rough
reconstruction of what his visa-file might have looked like. Why
Abdulmutallab? Through background interviews with national security
experts, I learned that Abdulmutallab is an ideal subject to explore the
challenges of ex post screening since he was radicalized after his visa
was approved. Moreover, it appears that the U.S.’s information
the U.S. could impose such criminal sanctions on U.S. citizens in U.S. territory,
absent affirmative collaboration in planning a terrorist attack.
41
This history is summarized in John Scanlan, Aliens in the Marketplace of
Ideas: The Government, the Academy and the McCarran-Walter Act, 66 TEX. L.
REV. 1481 (1988). As a later footnote makes clear, First Amendment challenges are
likely to fail.
42
For this reason, it is not within the scope of this essay to address many other
practical issues that might arise in the administration of this proposal, including
questions of standards of proof and so forth.
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concerning Abdulmutallab was what this Essay will term
“insufficiently networked.” In the future, this deficiency may be
remedied through the simple threat of strategic revocation of the visas
of elites, who may be the peers of would-be terrorists. Notably, the
U.S. is already strategic in visa revocation when pressing foreign
policy goals are at stake, as evidenced by its revocation of the visas of
Honduran elites in the aftermath of a Honduran coup. Additionally,
this section also lays out two critical portions of the “duty to snitch,”
namely the information-screening and sanctioning components,
drawing on the literature on collective sanctioning, and more broadly
on network theory.
In Part III, I shift from the primary subject, Abdulmutallab to the
“snitch,” namely, the elder Mutallab.
Although motives are
notoriously difficult to ascertain, it is important to consider the elder
Mutallab’s potential motives– precisely because we hope to create
incentives for similar behavior in others. I include an analysis of his
potential decision-making matrix incorporating insights from the
Nigerian blogosphere and other sources. In a departure from most
accounts, I suggest non-traditional motives. A somewhat cynical
game theory-inspired view would note that the elder Mutallab is a
quintessential “repeat game” player with the U.S. As a banker, he is
necessarily dependent on U.S. market access to conduct his business;
snitching may be viewed as a pre-emptive mechanism of protecting his
financial interests. Yet another view of Umarmutallab’s motives is
nobler. Nigerian society famously puts great stock on honor as a
value. Shame has been a prominent motif in the communal retelling
of Abdulmutallab’s narrative. Snitching may be conceived as a preemptive mechanism of mitigating an anticipated blow to familial,
tribal and national honor.
Notably, in this particular instance, communal norms appear to have
already been working in the U.S.’s favor. The U.S. may strategically
deploy this prioritization of family honor as a mechanism for
motivating persons to share important information. How does this
insight apply in practice? Prominent Islamic-American groups have
highlighted prosecutorial overkill namely, such as dragnets of Muslim
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student visa-recipients conducted after 9/11. 43 The key is to keep the
community on the side of the authorities. If terrorism is viewed as
antithetical to family honor, soft sanctions such as a threat of visarevocation may be more effective than heavy-handed approaches.
In Part IV, I discuss the metaphorical elephants in the room. Writing
in the racially charged context of the civil rights movement, Malcolm
X famously warned of the dangers of placing affirmative duties (i.e.,
to prevent harm) as opposed to negative duties (simply not to cause
harm) on certain subsections of the society. Although Malcolm X was
speaking specifically in reference to African-American Muslims, his
point was much broader, namely, that such actions may alienate
precisely those portions of the population whose support the law
enforcement authorities need. 44 There is also a concern regarding the
McCarthyite penumbra associated with a duty to snitch. Moreover,
the U.S. will need to guard against corruption of the process more
generally, particularly given the dangers of elite capture. For example,
elites may deliberately share inaccurate information to discredit
competitors. Finally, I address the implications of all of the foregoing
insights for U.S. immigration law and policy.

Part I: Setting Up the Theoretical Problem

43

This point has been made by several members of the umbrella advocacy
group, the American Muslim Political Coordination Council, including the Muslim
Public Affairs Council, the American Muslim Alliance, the American Muslim
Council and the Council on American Islamic Relations. The Council on American
Islamic relations, the largest Muslim lobby group has been particularly vocal in this
regard. See, generally, COUNCIL ON AMERICAN ISLAMIC RELATIONS, THE STATUS OF
MUSLIM CIVIL RIGHTS IN THE UNITED STATES: STEREOTYPES AND CIVIL LIBERTIES
(2002), http://www.cair.com/CivilRights/CivilRightsReports/2002Report.aspx; see
MUSLIMS IN AMERICA (2007),
also PEW RESEARCH CENTER,
http://pewresearch.org/assets/pdf/muslim-americans.pdf; see also Omar Sacibey,
Muslims look to blacks for civil rights guidance, RELIGION NEWS SERVICE, May 16,
2006, http://pewforum.org/news/display.php?NewsID=10521 (documenting the
concerns of Muslim lobby groups regarding prosecutorial heavy-handedness).
44
BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY: SPEECHES, INTERVIEWS, AND A LETTER BY
MALCOLM X. (George Breitman (ed.)) (1970), see also MALCOLM X THE
AUTOBIOGRAPHY OF MALCOLM X (with the assistance of Alex Haley) (1992);
MANNING MARABLE, ON MALCOLM X: HIS MESSAGE & MEANING (1992).
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a. Historical context for institutional design choices:
Why ex post screening has been neglected
Congress has charged the Executive branch with screening for a
dizzyingly large spectrum of alien “types,” from highly skilled
computer scientists, 45 to wealthy investors, 46 to aliens of
“extraordinary ability”47 to low-skilled guest workers. 48 Screening
millions of applicants for a wide range of specific types should
typically require institutions that are finely tuned to such goals.
However, a primary source of what one scholar has termed
immigration “dysfunction” is that institutions are poorly designed for a
primary function – namely, screening. 49 Cox and Posner’s exploration
of the comparative advantages of ex ante versus ex post screening in
institutional design has the potential to alleviate such dysfunction. 50
This is not an obscure academic issue. The importance of Cox and
Posner’s work can hardly be overstated: their institutional design focus
has enormous consequence for real-life questions of how immigration
law has historically been enforced. 51 Indeed, it is precisely because
their work is so important that their failure to appreciate the
importance of ex post screening in the context of the highly skilled is
so troubling.

45

8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2006) (containing H(1)(B) provisions for the
admission of the highly skilled).
46
See 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(5) (1994) (providing for visas to be issued to
immigrants who invest at least one million dollars in a start-up business that
generates full-time jobs for ten United States citizens or lawful residents; these are
generally known as “E” Treaty Investor Visas)
47
See 8 U.S.C. §1153(b)(1)(A)-(B) (providing for visas to be issued to
immigrants of "extraordinary ability" or who are "outstanding" with a significant
likelihood of making innovative contributions to the American economy); and
§1153(b)(2) (providing for visas to be issued to immigrants with advanced academic
training or who possess "exceptional ability").
48
8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(15)(H) (2006) (containing guest worker provisions).
49
An excellent discussion of how what he terms systemic “dysfunction” in the
immigration system is augmented by the challenges of screening is contained in
Mariano-Florentino Cuellar, The Political Economies of Immigration Law
(unpublished manuscript, on file with the author).
50
See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811.
51
A good summary of the implications of institutional design for “real life”
decision making is contained in also contained in Cuellar, supra note 49.
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But in at least one sense, this oversight is also unsurprising. The
federal government only began to restrict immigration in the late 19th
century and even then, there were no provisions making immigrants
deportable for post entry conduct. 52 These provisions were only
introduced in 1907 and significantly expanded over the last century. 53
However, as a matter of practice, ex post screening was focused on the
poor and low-skilled, as opposed to elites. 54
To support this point, some broad historical context is in order.
Zolberg’s landmark historical study of migration contends that prior to
the development of modern transportation and communications,
typically, very few persons left their countries of origin. 55 Even these
migrants customarily had some pre-existing connection to the country
of migration. Moreover, migrants generally met relatively little
resistance at the port of entry. 56 Zolberg notes that great “powers”
such as France and Great Britain liberally admitted migrants from their
broader colonial empires. 57 The overall thrust of his historical analysis
is clear: generally, the numbers of migrants were small, and admission
policies were liberal. There was little need for a complicated system
to determine which migrants merited admission. This was particularly
true in the U.S., which has been singularly welcoming to migrants. 58
52

See Introduction to GERALD NEUMAN, STRANGERS TO THE CONSTITUTION:
IMMIGRANTS, BORDERS AND FUNDAMENTAL LAW 1-25 (1996) .
53
Id.
54
ARISTIDE R. ZOLBERG, A NATION BY DESIGN: IMMIGRATION POLICY IN THE
FASHIONING OF AMERICA 436 (2006).
55
Introduction to ZOLBERG, supra note 54.
56
It bears emphasis that post-entry, migrants often found significant hostility
in adjusting to their new homes. Id at 50.
57
Even other empires that proved more resistant to long-term migration, such
as the Germans, liberally admitted short-term migrants according to their economic
dictates. The Germans typically denied migrants long-term membership. For a
discussion of the historical German approach to migrants, see e.g., Patrick Weil, All
or Nothing? What the United States Can Learn from Europe at
http://database.gmfus.org/rs/ct.aspx?ct=24F76C1FD6E40AEDC1D180ACD22F921
ADCBE5588F8A52DA2349D55444994EE21FC480CCED0D813CA335D773AA9
5658FE9FEA874847170E4EFF895E528EA32B9BC0599DFB0600D5A3404D2763
34C62FA51D8F2756E6638A3D1257F04 (German Marshall Fund, last visited
January 10, 2011).
58
Zolberg, supra note 54 at 57. Professor Neuman’s historical analysis of
American immigration law suggests a different interpretation than Zolberg’s of the
development of the rules governing U.S. immigration. His work discusses the
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All this changed in the 20th Century. The World Bank has argued that
a defining feature of the 20th Century was that people started to move
at previously unparalleled levels. 59 With unprecedented levels of
migration, came domestic political resistance to new migrants in
diverse countries. Social and economic pressures (from the Great
Depression to nativist political parties and so forth) culminated in a
similar outcome in different states: 60 more stringent rules across the
board in an effort to stem the flow of new migrants. 61
Yet even so, prior to the relatively recent development of the modern
state, it was difficult for the state to locate, exclude and deport
undesirable migrants. 62 As a practical matter of limited state capacity,
overwhelmingly, states focused on ex-ante screening. 63 The U.S. was
no different. If deportation was hardly a realistic policy option for a
young country with a still poorly developed state, it was much better
to determine whether a migrant was inadmissible ex ante.64
In the early 20th century, this changed. Why the new focus on ex post
screening? Among many possible factors, a structural change in the
nature of migration appears to be the primary factor. For most of U.S.
history, migrants were overwhelmingly documented entrants who
came through seaports. The nature of migration changed with
increasing numbers of undocumented migrants from Mexico and
Central America crossing at land borders, which were much more

development of complicated immigration rules at the state level early in the U.S.
Republic. See Gerald Neuman, The Lost Century of US Immigration Law, 93
COLUMB. L. REV. 183.
59
The World Bank has argued in a recent annual report that worldwide labor
mobility trends will lead migration to remain at the center of contentious political
debates worldwide. See WORLD BANK, GLOBAL ECONOMIC PROSPECTS 2006:
ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS OF REMITTANCES AND MIGRATION 72 (2009). In the last
three decades, the population of migrants in high income countries has doubled,
registering an annual growth rate of 3%. WORLD BANK, supra, at 26–27. Migrants
now constitute nearly 2.9% of the population worldwide, and 8.3% of the population
of industrialized countries. Id. See generally LANT PRITCHETT, LET THEIR PEOPLE
COME: BREAKING THE GRIDLOCK ON GLOBAL LABOR MOBILITY (2006).
60
WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at 26–27.
61
Id.
62
Zolberg, supra note 54 at 70.
63
Id.
64
Id.
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difficult to police than sea ports. 65 In the face of this type of
migration, an exclusive focus on ex ante exclusion became
anachronistic. 66
Ex post screening offered an alternative strategy. However, even after
ex post screening measures developed, there was minimal ex post
screening of the highly skilled until relatively recently, with a
significant spike in ex post screening after 9/11.67
b. Ex poste screening as the dominant strategy
Ex poste screening is no longer just an alternative strategy. It is now
arguably the primary mechanism of immigration enforcement. The
evidence is significant: immigration authorities currently expend more
resources on ex post screening than on ex ante screening. 68 Consider,
for example, the burgeoning federal law enforcement focus on
“crimmigration,” that is, the prosecution and deportation of aliens who
commit crime. Immigration cases now constitute the majority of all
federal criminal prosecutions. 69 Additionally, the increased emphasis
65

The landmark work in this regard has been conducted by Douglas Massey
at the Office of Population Research at Princeton University, who has analyzed
Mexican migratory patterns over the last century. See, e.g., DOUGLAS S. MASSEY,
JORGE DURAND & NOLAN J. MALONE, BEYOND SMOKE AND MIRRORS: MEXICAN
IMMIGRATION IN AN ERA OF ECONOMIC INTEGRATION (2002); DOUGLAS S. MASSEY,
Borderline Madness: America’s Counterproductive Immigration Policy, in
DEBATING IMMIGRATION 129 (CAROL SWAIN, ed. 2008).
66
See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811.
67
This point is well made in a report by the Center for Strategic and
International Studies. See “Security Controls on the Access of Foreign Scientists
and Engineers to the United States,” Center for Strategic and International Studies,
Commission on Scientific Communications and National Security
(http://www.csis.org/component/option,com_csis_pubs/
task,view/id,1921).
68
See generally Stephen H. Legomsky, The New Path of Immigration Law:
Asymmetric Incorporation of Criminal Justice Norms, 64 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 469
(2007).
69
Cox and Posner do not utilize the word “crimmigration,” which has gained
greater currency since the publication of their article. However, they clearly
reference the increasing utilization of federal enforcement resources to identify and
deport aliens who have committed relatively minor crimes. See Cox & Posner, supra
note 1, at 813. For an excellent summary of the data concerning the significant
increase in federal immigration prosecutions, see David Sklansky, Crime
Immigration and Ad Hoc Instrumentalism (unpublished manuscript, on file with the
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on post-entry screening is reflected in the fact that immigration law
often treats post-entry criminal behavior (in the U.S.) much more
harshly than equivalent pre-entry behavior criminal behavior (in a
migrant’s country of origin). 70 Indeed, a conviction that is not a
ground for excluding a first-time arriving alien may well constitute
grounds for deportation of a long-time permanent resident.71
Cox and Posner’s singular contribution is to offer a “macro” bird’s eye
view that provides critical context for this trend. In their view, a
primary reason for this institutional bias for post-entry as opposed to
pre-entry screening is information asymmetry. An alien must typically
commit in her visa application to abide by the rules governing the visa
in the event that she is eventually approved. 72 A potential migrant will
generally know more about herself and whether she will abide by the
rules than a consular officer. 73 The disproportionate focus on postentry screening reflects the fact that the U.S. is often better able to
access reliable information about aliens once they are in the country. 74
Questions of information asymmetry are most acute with respect to
low-skilled aliens. 75 The typical low skilled migrant lacks the
traditional documentary mechanisms of credibly establishing that she
is likely to be a law-abiding, productive contributor. 76 She is less
likely than the typical high-skilled applicant, to provide traditional and
tangible evidence of traits that are proxies for desirable “type” (such as

author). This issue is also discussed in the following articles. See generally
Legomsky, supra note 68 at 480; Teresa A. Miller, Citizenship & Severity: Recent
Immigration Reforms and the New Penology, 17 GEO. IMMIGR. L.J. 611 (2003);
Jennifer Chacón, Managing Migration Through Crime, 109 COLUM. L. REV. Sidebar
135 (2009); Juliet Stumpf, The Crimmigration Crisis: Immigrants, Crime, and
Sovereign Power, 56 AM. U. L. REV. 367 (2006). For a recent addition to this
literature, see Ingrid V. Eagly, Prosecuting Immigration, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 1281
(2011).
70
See generally Legomsky, supra note 68 at 480.
71
Id.
72
See e.g., DS-156: Department of State Visa Application, available at
https://evisaforms.state.gov/ds156.asp,
73
See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 811. I also discuss this issue in detail in
a previous contribution. See Brown, supra note 3, at 2488.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Brown, supra note 3, at 2499.
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graduation certificates). 77 Moreover, the typical low-skilled migrant
comes from a developing country with poorly-resourced and
sometimes corrupt public institutions. 78 Thus, individual-level
constraints are augmented by nationwide resource and governance
constraints, which undermine a potential migrant’s efforts to provide
evidence (such as credible police reports) 79 from the authorities of her
inclination to play by the rules. Thus, the resource challenges of the
developing world augment the challenges of information collection. In
summary, ex post screening mitigates these challenges.
c. Cox and Posner’s oversight
Cox and Posner’s analysis is generally positive as opposed to
normative. 80 That is, they are generally concerned with illuminating
which factors lead to immigration screening choices, as opposed to
criticizing these choices. Thus, they are generally agnostic as to
whether a state should typically pursue ex ante or ex post screening. 81
However, they come closest to critiquing the disproportionate focus on
ex post screening when it comes to migrants with elite credentials.
The information asymmetry rationale is less compelling for skilled
migrants. 82
In contrast to their low-skilled counterparts, the educational elite are
well-placed to provide tangible proxies that they have been lawabiding, productive community members in their country of origin,
such as university diplomas, professional affiliations and evidence of
business ownership. 83 Indeed, this is precisely why other jurisdictions
such as Canada and Australia have been able to develop “points”
systems, which reward highly skilled migrants with expedited visa
access. 84 Not only are highly skilled migrants able to provide
77

Id.
The World Bank annual report details the relevant characteristics of this
population that pose difficulties in screening. See WORLD BANK, supra note 59, at
57–58.
79
Id.
80
See Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 815.
81
Id.
82
Id.
83
Id
84
See Ayelet Shachar, The Race for Talent: Highly Skilled Migrants and
Competitive Immigration Regimes, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 148 (2006).
78
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documentary evidence of their academic, professional, and business
credentials. In the modern age of information technology, the DHS,
working with the State Department, can easily verify an elite
applicant’s credentials, even thousands of miles away in India or
China. 85 Consequently, the U.S., like its other developed-country
counterparts has access to highly detailed, fine-grained information
about the highly skilled, irrespective of where they live. 86
Accordingly, the U.S. has less justification for their ex post focus. 87
There is another reason that Cox and Posner are disturbed by the
disproportionate ex post focus. Historically, U.S. migration has
involved an implicit long-term contract, which has been termed
“immigration as contract.” 88 If persons are well-behaved, they are
generally viewed as “Americans in waiting” and are eligible for longterm membership through naturalization.89 An emphasis on ex post
screening (with the corresponding “sanction” of deportation) 90 implies
that the U.S. may later revoke this implicit contract. Herein lies the
dilemma: risk-averse, but talented high-skilled persons who are ideal
migrants may decline to migrate to the U.S. More bluntly put, why
should a computer programmer invest in migration to (and
assimilation into) the U.S., when she may later be found to be an
85

Id.
Id.
87
The phrase “immigration as contract” has been heavily utilized by
Motomura. See generally HIROSHI MOTOMURA, AMERICANS IN WAITING (2006). See
also Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 815.
88
The term “Americans in waiting,” which gained currency in recent
immigrants’ rights protests is originally Motomura’s. Id. See also Adam B. Cox &
Eric A. Posner, The Rights of Migrants: An Optimal Contract Framework, 84
N.Y.U. L. REV. 1403, 1407 (2009) (applying a similar metaphor of a “contract”
between the state and the migrant).
89
Id.
90
One might question the basis on which deportation might reasonably be
construed as a sanction. If an alien does not abide by the terms of her visa, and the
host country deports her, why is this not simply an enforcement of a contractual
obligation that the alien agreed to (as a condition of her visa) in the first place?
Indeed, there is a longstanding debate in the immigration law literature as to whether
deportation should in fact be viewed as a punishment. See Fong Yue Ting v. United
States, 149 U.S. 698, 730 (1893) (holding that “an order of deportation is not a
punishment for crime”); cf. Legomsky, supra note 68(arguing that theories of
deportation overlap so substantially with those of criminal punishment that
deportation should at least sometimes be regarded as a form of punishment).
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inappropriate “type” and subject to deportation? Why not go instead
to Canada?
There is significant evidence that skilled migrants contribute
disproportionately to U.S. economic growth. 91 Additionally, their
children are also likely to be highly productive. For example, New
York Times columnist Thomas Friedman discusses the children of
skilled immigrants who dominate the Spelling Bee and Intel Science
competitions, and ultimately go on to work and form high tech
companies. 92 While a broad array of lobby groups agree that
successful global recruitment of the highly skilled is essential to longterm U.S. economic growth, an institutional framework not well-suited
to such recruitment continues to undermine efforts to recruit highly
skilled immigrants. 93
Cox and Posner appear sensitive to these concerns; they are conscious
of and disinclined to contribute further to this poor institutional
framework. 94 Thus, they express a preference for ex ante screening in
the context of the highly-skilled. 95 In their words, “the main
91

A brief summary of this literature is included in Shachar, supra note 84.
For a good introduction to the global competition for skilled persons see Introduction
to MICHAEL PORTER ON COMPETITION (2008). See also Bump, Micah and B.
Lindsay Lowell, 2006. “Global Competition for International Students,” Institute for
the Study of International Migration, Georgetown University; Paula Stephan, &
Sharon Levin, Exceptional contributions to U.S. science by the foreign-born and
foreign-educated, POP. RES. & POL. REV. 20 (1):59–79 (2001); AnnaLee Saxenian,
Silicon Valley’s new immigrant high-growth entrepreneurs, ECON. DEV. QUART. 16
(1) 1:20–31 (2002); William Kerr, Ethnic scientific communities and international
technology diffusion, REV. ECON. & STAT. 90(3):518–37 (2008); Gnanaraj Chellaraj,
Keith Maskus & Aaditya Mattoo, The contribution of skilled immigrations and
international graduate students to U.S. innovation, REV. OF INT. ECON. 16 (3):444–
62 (2008); William Kerr & William F. Lincoln, The Supply Side of Innovation: H-1B
Visa Reforms and U.S. Ethnic Invention, J. OF LAB. ECON. 28 (3): 473-508 (2010);
Sari Pekkala and William R. Kerr, Economic Impacts of Immigration: A Survey,
Harvard Business School Working Paper, No. 09-013 (2011) (On file with author);
Wadhwa, Vivek, AnnaLee Saxenian, Ben Rissing & Gary Gereffi, America’s new
immigrant entrepreneurs I, Working Paper, Duke University (2007) (on file with
author); Madeline Zavodny, The H-1B program and its effects on information
technology workers, FED. RES. BANK OF ATLANTA ECON. REV. 3:1–11 (2008).
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See FRIEDMAN, supra note 19.
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This point is made by Cuellar. See Cuellar, supra note 49.
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advantage of the ex ante system is that it reduces the risk faced by
potential immigrants that they will be deported, so that risk-averse
noncitizens are more likely to enter and invest in the country than they
are under the ex post system.” 96
This Essay points out a critical oversight in Cox and Posner’s
framework: they do not discuss the importance of targeted ex post
mechanisms of screening the highly skilled. Why is this problematic?
U.S. immigration policy currently finds itself on the horns of a
dilemma. While the highly skilled are clearly critical to U.S. economic
growth, terrorist networks have stepped up their recruiting among the
highly skilled. Moreover, the highly skilled are also most likely to gain
access to the U.S. They are also singularly well-prepared to execute
terrorist attacks.
The bottom line: While Cox and Posner are correct in stating that ex
ante screening may be more appropriate for elites, ex post screening is
still critical. What is needed is a targeted mechanism of ex post
screening that meets U.S. security concerns, while not undermining
efforts to recruit the best and the brightest. In the next section, I
consider how this goal might be accomplished through the lens of
Abdulmutallab and other highly skilled terrorist subjects.

Part II: Abdulmutallab
a. A Note on Methodology
A word on methodology is in order. In this section, my primary
subject is Abdulmutallab, the Nigerian “Underwear” bomber, and elite
engineering graduate who received a multiple-year, multiple-entry
visitor’s visa. As a Nigerian national, Abdulmutallab would have been
required to submit his visa application at a U.S. consulate in Nigeria.97
The question becomes: What was available to the U.S. consulate in
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This requirement is stipulated by the State Department Visa Rules. See
http://nigeria.usembassy.gov/non-immigrant_visas.html
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Nigeria on both an ex ante and ex post basis? I consider how the
consular authorities might have “filled in the blanks.”
Typically, visa-files are not available for public view. Moreover, for
obvious reasons, subsequent law enforcement interviews with terror
suspects are classified. Thus, I am only able to create a rough reenaction of what a subject’s visa-file might have contained. In an
effort to find an ideal subject, I created a narrow list of potential
subjects, including only elites who had either carried out or attempted
to carry out a terrorist attack. In order to further narrow down this list,
I interviewed persons with national security expertise. While
Abdulmutallab was not a long-term migrant, 98 repeatedly, he was
recommended by such experts as a subject choice.
This recommendation primarily arises from the fact that
Abdulmutallab was the subject of extensive reporting, by not only the
Western press, but also the Nigerian press. It appears that Nigerian
journalists were able to access on-the-ground sources, which were
more difficult for foreign correspondents to find. Why is this relevant?
Notably, it was the Nigerian (as opposed to the U.S.) press, which first
reported that Abdulmutallab’s father had visited the U.S. consulate
repeatedly to raise concerns about his son.99 Nigerian journalists have
been essential to Western media outlets (and indeed to this Essay). In
comparison to other countries from which elite terror suspects have
originated, such as Saudi Arabia, Pakistan and Egypt, Nigeria is more
highly ranked on indices of press freedom. This perhaps enabled more
rigorous on-the-ground reporting, particularly in the subject’s tightly-
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It bears emphasis: Abdulmutallab was not admitted as a long-term
immigrant. Cox and Posner’s primary focus is on mechanisms of screening
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citizenship). However, they point out that their analytical framework is also
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Cox & Posner, supra note 1, at 813–14.
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See e.g., Dora Akunyulim, Mutallab is a Stranger, NEXT (an online
Nigerian news consolidator), Dec. 28, 2009,
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knit Muslim community. 100 This has typically not occurred in other
terror suspects’ home countries.
Moreover my research was also aided considerably by extensive
reporting by European news outlets. What accounts for their interest?
Although Abdulmutallab attempted to detonate a bomb on a U.S.
bound flight, he could just have made a similar attempt in the
European Union (“E.U.”) given his easy access to several E.U.
countries. Indeed, Abdulmutallab boarded the U.S. bound flight in the
Netherlands. Moreover, he had previously received multiple E.U.
(Schengen) visas, which authorized admission to many E.U. member
states. 101 Abdulmutallab had also previously received a U.K. student
visa. It appears that only one state – the U.K. – rejected his application
for visa renewal (presumably on the basis of ex post screening, since
he had previously received a visa). Thus, in several different
jurisdictions, journalists were seeking to determine why their own
immigration authorities had failed to successfully screen him. 102 This
accounts for the availability of detailed news accounts which allowed
me to assemble a rough reconstruction of information that might have
been missing from his visa file.

b. Abdulmutallab’s Visa Application

100

See the 2009 Index of Press Freedom published by Reporters without
Borders. While Nigeria is still in the bottom half, it is clearly more highly ranked
than all the other countries mentioned. See Reporters Without Borders, 2009 Press
Freedom Index at http://en.rsf.org/spip.php?page=classement&id_rubrique=1001.
101
The Netherlands is a signatory to the Schengen Agreement, a treaty (signed
near the town of Schengen in Luxembourg), between five of the ten member states
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A consideration of Abdulmutallab’s network is enlightening. He went
to one of Africa’s most exclusive private schools, the British School of
Togo, to which very few Africans gain admission, and which even
fewer can afford to attend. 103 He studied there for the prestigious
International Baccalaureate examination. 104 While he was denied
admission to Stanford University, he did well sufficiently well in his
high school examinations, to attend the University of London’s highly
selective engineering program. 105 While there, he achieved an honors
engineering degree. 106 In London, he lived in a family apartment in
one of the city’s chicest districts. 107 He was surrounded by relatives
and friends who were part of a tightly knit group of rich Nigerian
expatriates in London. 108
Abdulmutallab had a multiple-entry, multiple-year visitor’s visa, also
known as the B-2 visa. 109 Although this visa-category is in principle
available to any Nigerian national who is not a visa-overstay or
security risk, in practice the documentary requirements are so
stringent that only a tiny minority of elite Nigerians are typically
eligible. 110 In the Nigerian context, Abdulmutallab achieved what a
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former Ambassador has termed an exclusive badge of honor – namely
a U.S. visa. 111
In the aftermath of Abdulmutallab’s attempted bombing, DHS was
accused of having missed important clues while screening. 112 The
U.S. presumably had many mechanisms of verifying Abdulmutallab’s
bona fides. His ties to formal institutions were well documented, his
family was prominent, and he was well known at his schools. 113 He
appears to have had a detailed paper trail.
The centrality of contesting claims regarding the ease of screening the
young Mutallab obscures an important point - in this particular
Nigerians with non-immigrant visas is miniscule. See a summary of the figures,
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at
STATE
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http://travel.state.gov/pdf/FY08AnnualReportTableXVII.pdf. This is a tiny
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context, screening raises peculiar concerns. Since even applicants for
temporary tourist visas are presumed under the Immigration and
Nationality Act (“INA”) to have immigrant intent, the burden is on the
average applicant to prove that she is coming to the U.S. temporarily
and does not intend to abandon her country of origin. 114 As such, the
typical visa recipient must successfully demonstrate significant ties to
her country of origin and financial assets to support herself while
visiting the U.S. 115
As evidence of home-country ties, Abdulmutallab’s visa application
would typically have noted his extensive family in Nigeria. As
evidence of his ability to support himself while in the U.S., it would
undoubtedly have noted his family’s significant asset base, including
major shareholdings in several companies and valuable real estate in
the E.U. and the U.S. Further evidence of non-immigrant intent would
be his history of travel without visa-overstays. Moreover, his previous
studies at an elite boarding school and at an elite engineering program
would also be relevant since it would typically be difficult for welleducated persons to work as undocumented aliens in the U.S.
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Indeed, on the basis of a typical ex ante screen, Abdulmutallab would
not have looked substantially different than any other well-educated
and wealthy Nigerian. As one interview subject pointed out, without
the benefit of hindsight bias, 116 Abdulmutallab’s profile is not
substantially different than that of Adebayo Ogunlesi, another welleducated Nigerian national who first came to the U.S. as a young man.
He subsequently went on to graduate from Harvard Business School,
become an Editor of the Harvard Law Review, a Supreme Court clerk
and Vice-Chairman of Credit Suisse. 117 Indeed, Ogunlesi is precisely
the sort of elite that Cox and Posner are worried about deterring.
Moreover, Abdulmutallab’s profile is not discernibly different from
many other well-educated Nigerians who now constitute the largest
group of foreign-trained doctors in the U.S. 118 How could a visaofficer be reasonably expected to differentiate Abdulmutallab from
this pool?
Moreover, Ambdulmutallab reminds us that the profiles of elite visarecipients may change in critical ways after they first receive their
visas. What the consular offer could not have anticipated is
Abdulmutallab’s time at a religious training institute in Yemen run by
an American imam, whose role in training terrorists is apparently so
significant that his assassination has been authorized by President
Obama. 119 A consular officer would also not have anticipated his
leadership role of a student Islamic society that was well-known for
inviting radical speakers to his London university campus. 120
116
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Although elites are typically in a much better position than non-elite
visa applicants to submit detailed paper trails, screening on an ex ante
basis is complicated by the fact that their resources allow them to
obscure “red flags,” such as travel to countries on terrorist watch lists.
For example, Abdulmutallab’s passport bore no Yemeni entry stamp
although he traveled there repeatedly, presumably because he had the
resources to bribe Yemeni immigration officials. 121 He is likely to
have omitted this information from any application for U.S. visarenewal. Indeed, this was also true of the would-be Times Square
bomber, Shahzad. He was able to obscure another clear “red flag,”
namely, his repeated trips to an al Qaeda stronghold in Pakistan.
The bottom line: These facts reinforce the critical nature of Cox and
Posner’s omission. Aliens, like all people, are not static personalities.
Both Abdulmutallab and Shahzad’s profiles changed such that they no
longer matched the US visa “types;” they underwent extreme
radicalization only after they received their first U.S. visas. Thus, they
would probably not have been excluded through ex ante screening.
Arguably it is precisely because of this challenge that in the aftermath
of 9/11, the U.S. panicked and “overreached,” in its ex post screening
of elites. 122 In addition to plentiful stories of Muslim elites whose
visa-applications were delayed or denied, there emerged myriad
narratives of revocations of the visas of elites subsequent to their
acceptance of positions in the U.S. 123 Indeed, U.S. universities
121
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asserted that they were losing recruits, because scholars were
unwilling to subject themselves to the stigma of potential visa
revocation, a problem that they also experienced during the McCarthy
era. 124 Such criticism of the post 9/11 dragnet 125 reinforces the point
that screening must be narrow and targeted. 126 Mohammed Atta is
one engineer of Middle Eastern origin. Another is Pierre Omidyar, the
Founder of eBay. It is unclear that such dragnets distinguish between
the Attas and the Omidyars of this world. With these sorts of screening
techniques, could the next immigrant Nobel Laureate would end up
elsewhere?
What is needed is a targeted mechanism of ex post screening that
meets U.S. security concerns, while not undermining efforts to recruit
the best and the brightest. The question then becomes, how could the
authorities have accessed the relevant information? This is the subject
of the next section.
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c. The Situation Then and Now
In the months following 9/11, detailed hearings laid bare the historical
difficulty that the U.S. had in penetrating terrorist networks. 127 Much
was made of the failures of human intelligence. 128 Most disturbing
was the fact that many of the 9/11 hijackers appeared to be operating
in the clear light of day. These young engineers were widely
recognized in their universities, their mosques, and more broadly in
their communities. Although they were typically described as middleclass Saudis, there was little doubt that they were educational elites.
They had graduated from elite Saudi universities with highly technical
engineering degrees. Many people had reason to know their
tendencies towards radicalism and notably, no one had snitched.
Fast forward to the present. Nearly ten years after 9/11, it is apparent
that Al Qaeda and its affiliates have attempted to move “up” the food
chain by attracting even more elite participants. 129 The list of recent
high profile suicide bombers reads like a “who’s who” of elites in their
countries of origin. Consider, for example, the following persons.
Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, the Al-Qaeda affiliated suicide
bomber who killed several CIA operatives in Afghanistan, was a
highly regarded doctor who placed very well in the Jordanian national
exams. 130 His wife was a Turkish author of some repute. 131 Indeed, he
127
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was sufficiently well-known to Jordanian elites, to have a working
relationship with the highest level of Jordanian intelligence, including
a member of the Jordanian royal family. 132 His radical tendencies
were well known. 133
Omar Sheikh, the mastermind of the beheading of Wall Street Journal
reporter, Daniel Pearl and a financial supporter of the 9/11 attacker
Mohammed Atta, was from a rich Pakistani-British family. 134 He
studied at a prestigious British boarding school. 135 Indeed, he
represented Britain in the International Athletic World
Championships, achieved top grades in the Cambridge-administered
high-school exams and studied at the prestigious LSE. 136 As with the
other subjects, the signs were there. 137 Again, no one snitched. 138
The key is to provide incentives for persons with better information
and access to accomplish U.S. goals. The U.S. already does this in a
competent manner when critical foreign policy goals are at stake.
As the next section contends, it’s simply a matter of motivating the
right people, namely, repeat-game players who need to visit the U.S.
d. Outsourced Diplomacy: Motivating the Right People
On June 28, 2009, President Manuel Zelaya of Honduras was exiled
following an internal coup. In the months subsequent to the coup, the
U.S. repeatedly expressed the view that the coup was inconsistent with
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the constitutional obligations of the Honduran government. 139 The
U.S. refused to recognize the interim government, and encouraged the
interim President Roberto Micheletti (and presumed coup-plotter) to
come to the negotiating table. 140
For months, the Micheletti
administration refused to negotiate, and failed to respond to a series of
U.S. efforts to ratchet up the pressure, including the cancellations of
the visas of government ministers. 141
Then suddenly, members of the Honduran business elite found that
their visas had been revoked. 142 Even a cursory network map
confirms that the subjects of the visa-revocations were all
businesspersons with close relationships to Micheletti. 143 The
revocations were targeted and strategic. The implicit message was
clear. They should utilize their influence to bring their government to
the negotiating table or face the prospect of having their visas revoked
indefinitely.
The visa revocations appear to have stung particularly hard, causing
some shame among Honduran elites. 144
These Honduran
businesspersons are quintessential “repeat game” players with the
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U.S. 145 Their businesses export to the U.S. 146 They utilize U.S.-based
correspondent banks. Their children often study in the U.S. 147 Given
these extensive business and familial networks in the U.S., visarevocation effectively curtailed their ability to accomplish important
personal and commercial objectives. It could not have been lost on
them that the U.S. had the ability to make their lives substantially
more difficult if the Micheletti government did not negotiate. Again
using game theoretic analogies, individuals with a high degree of
dependence on the U.S. have maximal incentives to comply with U.S.
diplomatic objectives, since the costs of defection are obviously high.
Indeed, the U.S. has utilized similar techniques to accomplish
diplomatic goals with respect to Cuba. For example, prestigious hotel
chains were operating hotels on properties, which were the subject of
legal proceedings following their expropriation from CubanAmericans by the Castro regime. 148 Although the hotel chains were
not parties to the legal proceedings and simply tenants on the
properties now “owned” by the Cuban government, the U.S. revoked
the visas of the hotels’ principals. 149 The hoteliers quickly terminated
their leases, thereby depriving the Cuban administration of needed
lease revenue. 150 Since these hoteliers were multinational chains that
were heavily dependent on American tourists in other markets, they
understood that their business model could have been greatly
compromised if they continued to do business with Cuba. That is,
they too had minimal incentives to counter the U.S.
145
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In Honduras, the U.S. succeeded. In Cuba, the U.S. did not (although
it did accomplish the more modest goal of depriving the Cuban
administration of needed revenue). Honduras came to the bargaining
table quickly. The process was undoubtedly accelerated by the
intervention of businesspersons who had better information about their
government than the U.S. and were better placed to apply pressure to
their President. The U.S. effectively “contracted out” their diplomatic
functions.
Admittedly, there are clear differences between the Cuban and
Honduran instances of “outsourced diplomacy” and this proposal. In
both the Cuban and Honduran cases, the target group was small. The
threat of visa revocations pressured specific visa holders to take a
specific action. That is, there was a direct and non-nebulous
connection between the goal in question and the visa holders in
question. Additionally, even though this Essay’s proposal is focused
on a relatively small group of elites who inhabit the apices of their
societies, it clearly involves a much broader target group (i.e.,
associates of as-yet-unidentified elites who may carry out terrorist
acts). Thus, the connection between the target group and the desired
outcome is clearly more tenuous.
Notwithstanding these differences, the central lesson of outsourced
diplomacy is still germane to the challenge of identifying which elites
with U.S. visas may carry out a terrorist attack. Individuals care what
their peers think about them. Visas not only facilitate travel, they are
status conveyers, and visa denial may undermine the status of the
person who loses her visa. 151 Thus, persons can be influenced to
achieve U.S. goals by the strategic allocation and denial of visas. This
is the subject of the next section.
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e. The Screening and Sanctioning Principles
The U.S. currently finds itself in the absurd position of screening elite
aliens utilizing poor information. Consular officers may have the
standard information: curriculum vitae, bank records, professional
affiliations, university diplomas. However, consular officers lack the
nuanced information needed to read between the lines. For example,
why was Abdulmutallab often missing classes at university? Given
his strong academic performance, there would be nothing in his paper
trail to indicate that he missed classes to frequent mosques that were
known for radicalism. 152 And why did he drop out of the elite
business program in Dubai? 153 Did he remain in Dubai or did he travel
to Yemen? With the benefit of a few conversations with classmates
and friends, the authorities would potentially have had access to
credible information about his unusual behavior, even after they
granted his visa.
Herein lies the paradox. Although terrorist groups are typically
difficult for Westerners to penetrate, the same cannot be said of elite
networks. Indeed, popular networking websites for elites such as “A
Small World” are dedicated precisely to this idea.154 Yet, the
information utilized to process visa applications is what I would term
“insufficiently networked.” It is garnered with little reference to the
networks in which aliens typically occupy, including networks of
family, friends, high school classmates, university peers, business
associates and tribal members. This is even as these network members
are generally better information collectors than the U.S. government.
After all, they are “on the ground” with the persons in question.
There is precedent for creating incentives for associates of would-be
terrorists to share information. Indeed, this is precisely why Congress
created the S visa, which provides long-term visas to those who offer
152

For a description of the dangers of extreme Islamic student societies, which
often serve as a gateway to radicalism, see Venetia Thompson, supra note 120.
153
Profile
of
Abdulmutallab,
BBC
NEWS,
Jan.
7,
2010,
http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8431530.stm.
154
A SMALL WORLD, www.asmallworld.net (“a small world is a private
community of internationally minded people from around the world” typically
featuring stories about elites in business, education, government, the nongovernmental sector and cultural from all five continents).

38

valuable intelligence information. 155 But the S visa is not welltargeted to elites and it is elite cooperation that is essential. Given
their privileged status in their own countries and their generally easy
access to U.S. visa privileges, they are less likely than others to be
attracted by the prospect of an S visa authorizing a long-term U.S.
stay. Elites need a different kind of incentive. The U.S. has to threaten
to take away something that they value.
Herein enters the power of association. Although the idea of social
networks appears to be a modern concept, human beings have always
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he officially encouraged various Justice Department personnel to make liberal use of
S-visas in "appropriate cases." In those instances in which a person who is willing to
share important terrorism-related information is ineligible for an S-visa, the Att'y
General urged the officials to consider parole or deferred action as an incentive for
cooperation. See 78 IR at 1816-17 (Dec. 3, 2001).”) There are also other visas that
incentivize “snitching” including the following: the U and T visas. For a discussion
of the U visa see LEGOMSKY & RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2 at 411 ("The U-visas are
for those who have 'suffered substantial physical or mental abuse' as the result of . . .
rape, torture, trafficking, incest, domestic violence, sexual assault, prostitution,
female genital mutilation, involuntary servitude, abduction, felonious assault, and
several other criminal acts. The person must possess information concerning that
criminal activity and must help law enforcement officials to investigate or prosecute.
INA § 101(a)(15)(U).”) For a discussion of the T visa See LEGOMSKY &
RODRIGUEZ, supra note 2 at 411 (“T visas are for victims of a 'severe form of
trafficking in persons' who are physically present in the United States or a port of
entry as a result of that trafficking. If age 18 or over, the person must comply with
any reasonable request for assistance in the investigation or prosecution of the
trafficking. INA § 101(a)(5)(T)”)
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been social creatures; we live, work and play in groups. 156 This basic
intuition underlies much of modern life. Facebook’s extraordinary
success is simply a manifestation of this intuition. 157 And yet,
although this seems obvious, we have failed to take account of this
intuition in how we grant and revoke visas to enhance national
security.
The “visa to snitch” proposal is based on two major arguments, which
will be succinctly referred to as the information-screening component
and the sanctioning component.
The information screening
component argues that network members who are proximate to visa
recipients may be motivated to share with officials inside information
as to which persons are likely to be terrorist threats. The sanctioning
component contends that astute officials can utilize soft rules, which
leverage the ties within networks to send signals to network members
about the costs associated with not sharing information that may be
relevant to terrorist investigations.
The information-screening component contends that the U.S. should
motivate network members to aid in both ex ante and ex post
screening. That is, network members should be incentivized to share
information in the initial screening process, that is, before visas are
issued. But as importantly, they should also be provided with
incentives to share such information even after visa issuance. Thus,
an elite visa-recipient would be sanctioned essentially for failing to
report evidence of the transgressions of his peers even if these
transgressions occurred after the person had already received a visa.
Why is this important? Some of Abdulmutallab’s associates admitted
that although they found his behavior troubling, they had not raised an
alarm since they took his student visa to constitute evidence that he
had already been screened by competent authorities. Under this
proposal, excuses such as these would not be acceptable.
f. What’s the Appropriate Sanction?
156
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Of course a “duty to snitch” must necessarily be accompanied by a
sanction. Under “a visa to snitch,” the U.S. would penalize network
members by revoking their visas (or at a minimum reducing the
likelihood of visa renewal), if they cannot account for their failure to
share pertinent information about a network member’s terrorist
sympathies that it appears that they had reason to know. If not as a
de jure matter, certainly as a de facto matter, elites typically have
access to immigration privileges that are not normally available to
their fellow nationals. 158 In exchange for this privilege, recipients of
elite visa access should understand that there are implicit duties.
This proposal has clear resemblances to collective sanctioning
systems, where community members are sanctioned for the sins of
their communal peers. Historically collective sanctions have been
employed effectively to improve compliance in a variety of informal
arenas in which formal structures for the collection of information
were either not present or insufficient.159 Although such resemblances
are thin as opposed to thick, this point should be conceded. Collective
sanctioning systems have generally been criticized for failing to abide
by the principle that individual wrongdoers should pay for their
individual transgressions and, thus raise significant justice concerns.
158
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similar functional rationales. See also, Alan O. Sykes, Vicarious Liability, 3 THE
NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS AND THE LAW 673-77 (1998) and
Lewis A. Kornhauser & Richard L. Revesz, Joint and Several Liability, 3 THE NEW
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Beyond the law review literature, the economics literature also has an extensive
discussion of functional rationales for collective sanctioning. For example,
economic historians credit collective sanctioning for facilitating a commercial
revolution in late medieval times by allowing long-distance commercial exchange
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Coalitions in Medieval Trade: Evidence on the Maghribi Traders, 49 J. ECON. HIST.
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Thus, the question of the appropriateness of the penalty is delicate,
particularly given that the signs of terrorist sympathies are often
nebulous. Hence, the sanctioning principle emphasizes that sanctions
should be “soft.” In so doing, I contrast it with sanctions that are
typically experienced as “hard.” For example, the U.S. decision to
subject all Nigerian travelers to significantly increased scrutiny
(following Abdulmutallab’s bomb attempt) was understood by
Nigerians as an affront to their national dignity and arguably qualifies
as a “hard” sanction. 160
It bears emphasis: signs of terrorist activity are often nebulous. Again,
the case of the younger Mutallab is instructive. Take for example, his
leadership of a university Islamic society that has been called a
“hotbed of radicalism.” 161 With the benefit of hindsight commentators
argued that this was a clear warning sign. 162 However, it is not clear
that this warning sign would have been evident to the average
observer. Indeed, given historical context, the very designation of
Abdulmutallab’s membership in a student group as a “red flag” may
cause our antennas to go up. During the McCarthy era, many students
were denied First Amendment protection as “radicals.” 163 AntiVietnam student groups were investigated precisely because they were
perceived as “hotbeds of radicalism” 164 by the Nixon administration.
Historians have subsequently judged such investigations to have been
motivated by paranoia. 165 Thus, there is a fine line between vigilance
and paranoia. Leadership of a controversial student group does not
necessarily signify a tendency to violence (although an Islamist
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society is arguably of a different character than a Vietnam protest
group).
Was his leadership of an Islamist student group relevant? 166 Since
several leaders of this particular student group have been indicted on
terrorism charges, it appears that the answer is yes. 167 Should his
friends have subsequently been accountable for failing to alert the
authorities to his leadership of this group? There is clearly a potential
issue of hindsight bias: research on human judgment suggests that the
typical subject has difficulty ignoring a known outcome when
assessing an event's likelihood. 168 Moreover, there is also the issue of
what behavior we may reasonably expect the average non-expert
network member to consider suspicious. While Abdulmutallab’s
leadership of an Islamist society might have appeared relevant to an
expert eye, this might not have been clear to a reasonable (but nonexpert) network member.
This is precisely why prior to visa-revocation, the visa-recipient (who
is suspected of not having shared pertinent information) should clearly
have an opportunity to explain herself. 169 Moreover, a soft approach in
sanctioning is counseled by the fact that rather than simply imposing
negative duties not to cause harm, the authorities would be imposing
affirmative duties to prevent harm. The aim is to impose a soft
sanction, that is, a penalty that is sufficiently tough to deter noncompliance, but not so tough as to undermine precisely the
cooperation that one is trying to encourage.
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Indeed, the INA already allows the authorities discretion to deny visas
to individuals who are believed to have weak connections to terrorist
networks, without providing them any opportunity to disabuse
authorities of such suspicions. 170 This proposal appears more
reasonable, in that persons will be given an opportunity to explain
themselves. The point is that there is an obvious line-drawing issue
here, but it hardly different than the type of line-drawing issue that law
enforcement officials regularly deal with in the course of many
investigations. Given the inherently imprecise nature of terrorist
sympathies, it will be incumbent on an official will take this into
account in determining whether an associate of a suspect should
reasonably have known or have reported her suspicions.
Notably, visa applications do not typically ask applicants to list
associates. This is an interesting omission. During the Cold War,
U.S. visa applicants were regularly asked to name their affiliations
with Communist persons. 171 The point is not to ally this proposal with
the misguided methods of the McCarthy era, but simply to point out
that this omission in the visa application could easily be remedied. In
any event, it is unclear that the government would necessarily want to
rely on references provided by the applicant. Savvy applicants would
simply fail to list associates who might raise alarm. Moreover, even in
the absence of associates provided by the applicant, modern network
analysis (the subject of the next section) will allow the government to
generate its own network list.
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g. Why the Solution Can Work
Given recent lessons from social network theory, 172 finding the right
people to shed light on potentially problematic visa-applicants is
entirely practical. Although social network theory has only recently
gained currency in the popular imagination as a consequence of the
ubiquitousness of social networking sites, its insights are not new,
drawing as they do from long-established precepts of sociology,
anthropology, computer science and organizational behavior.
We can understand social network analysis as:
map(ping) and measur(ing) formal and informal relationships
to understand what facilitates or impedes the knowledge flows
that bind interacting units, viz., who knows whom and who
shares what information and knowledge with whom by what
communication media . . . Because these relationships are not
usually readily discernable, social network analysis is
somewhat akin to an “organizational x-ray.” 173
Network theory coupled with modern technology provides an easy
mechanism of verifying which persons are members of a network.
Again, Abdulmutallab is a case in question. Notably, he had 287
Facebook friends the day before his terrorist attack. 174 Notably, after
the incident, “the number (of Facebook friends) appeared to be falling
172
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http://lrs.ed.uiuc.edu/TSE-portal/analysis/social-network-analysis/.(Social networks
are defined as “[n]odes of individuals, groups, organizations, and related systems
that tie in one or more types of interdependence: these include shared values, visions
and ideas; social contacts, kinship, conflict; financial exchanges, trade, joint
membership in organizations; and group participation in events, among numerous
other aspects of human relationships.”)
173
NOEL TICHY ET AL., Social Network Analysis for Organizations, 4 THE
ACAD. OF MAN. REV., 507 (1979).
174
Rich Tehrani, (Dec. 29, 2009), http://blog.tmcnet.com/blog/richtehrani/security/terrorist-umar-farouk-abdulmutallab-a-social-networker.html.
See
also Adam Gabbatt, Web Postings of Abdulmutallab, GUARDIAN UK, Dec. 29, 2009,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2009/dec/29/web-postings-umar-faroukabdulmutallab.

45

fast.” 175 The point is that people care about which networks they are
perceived to be a part of. Clearly, his Facebook friends did not want
be perceived as part of his network. However, ex post opportunistic
electronic behavior could not eliminate the pre-existing electronic
tracks. From reports in the blogosphere, it appears likely that many of
these individuals have since been subject to questioning, whether they
“unfriended” Abdulmutallab or not. 176
However, there is the problem of information overload. Who precisely
is elite? The elite by definition are a group of relatively small size,
occupying a position of privilege within a much larger society. But
the question remains: which elites precisely should be targeted? There
must be thousands (if not more cases) where persons exhibit troubling
behaviors, which are unconnected to terrorist tendencies. Verifying
the information provided will increase the time and expense required
to process visas, but without verification the process seems pro forma.
It would be difficult to sort out the truly useful information from the
sea of not-so-useful information. How is the U.S. government going to
sort through this potential flood of information?
I have resisted the inclination to identify, which particular categories
of elites the proposal would apply to. This question is best left to
technical experts with national security expertise. Even without the
benefit of inside information, some mechanisms of classifying elites to
reduce information overload are immediately apparent. 177
For
example, elite terrorists appear to be disproportionately likely to have
science and engineering backgrounds. Similarly, elite terrorists seem
to be disproportionately likely to come from particular regions of the
world. The authorities might impose the obligation to snitch only on
elites from those regions, in the interest of mitigating the problems of
information overload. However, this would feed into a perception that
the obligation falls disproportionately on Muslims or those of Middle
Eastern origin. In the interest of not alienating precisely those elites
175
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where cooperation is most needed, DHS might resist the tendency to
categorize publicly, imposing the obligation on a much broader
category of elites, even if they later focus on information provided by
elites of particular nationalities.

Part III: Why did the elder Mutallab Snitch?
Background
A more detailed consideration of the elder Mutallab’s network is
instructive. Umarmutallab was a former Nigerian Cabinet Minister 178
and Chairman of one of Nigeria’s largest banks. 179 He was a member
of the Board of Directors of several publicly traded Nigerian firms. 180
He was also particularly prominent in the Muslim community as the
primary patron of a well-known mosque. 181
Umarmutallab is described as someone “whose friends cut across
states, religion and sex.” 182 In the words of a Nigerian commentator,
“the older Mutallab benefitted from his deft positioning across an
immense network of family, geo-ethnic and professional layers of
interests. Consequently, the man has had a near permanent presence
on Nigeria’s economic landscape as government official, banking
178
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that his father’s affluence upset Abdulmutallab)

47

investor, facilitator or shareholder –working the levers of power– all
through civilian and military governments in Nigeria for more than 35
years.” 183
a. Rational Motives
With the benefit of hindsight, Umarmutallab’s behavior appears to
have been well thought out and highly planned. Irrespective of
whether his larger strategic goals might have been to save his son’s
life, maintain his mobility, protect his financial assets, or preserve his
familial honor, tactically, he took several steps to achieve his broader
goals.
Firstly, he utilized his private networks to signal disapproval of his
son’s behavior. For example, the elder Mutallab withdrew financial
support from his son. 184 He did not hide this information; he shared
his decision with family and close associates. 185 In so doing, he made
clear to his private networks that he disapproved of Abdulmutallab’s
decision to relocate to Yemen while implicitly communicating that
anyone else who offered support would incur his disapproval.
But notably, the elder Mutallab moved beyond these quintessentially
private actions taken in private networks. Importantly, he took the
much larger step of signifying his disapproval to the public authorities
by snitching. He met with the Nigerian security officials at the highest
levels. 186 He sought their assistance in curtailing his son’s travel
overseas and arranging his return to Nigeria. 187
Thirdly, through Nigerian security officials, Umarmutallab arranged
meetings with their American counterparts. He met with Embassy
officials repeatedly, providing evidence of his son’s increasing
radicalism including details of his travel to Yemen. 188 He expressed
particular concern that his son indicated in a telephone call that he did
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not expect to see his family again. 189 Furthermore, the elder Mutallab
reportedly met with a senior officer at the CIA. 190 Through all these
efforts, Umarmutallab indicated very clearly whose side he was on.
Not only was he not providing support to a terrorist network, he also
underlined that he was willing to help disrupt it.
Why did Umarmutallab snitch? Although commentators emphasized
the heart-wrenching nature of the father’s decision to report his child
to the authorities, the emotional nature of the decision does not
preclude strategic behavior. Speculation as to the father’s motives in
subsequent analyses has been rife. Motives are notoriously difficult to
ascertain. Indeed, two millennia after Judas Ischariot snitched to the
Romans, 191 we are still speculating about what made him do it! Yet in
this instance ascertaining potential motives may be fruitful to the
extent that it helps us to provide incentives for similar behavior in the
future.
Some may have a rather cynical view of Umarmutallab’s actions. As
a very wealthy man with assets in many countries, he could hardly
afford for these assets to be frozen simply because of the wayward
actions of his son. As one relative noted, “[t]his is somebody who has
investments in the Western world since before the boy was born . . .
[h]e’s got a £4 million house in London. Now the boy is jeopardizing
everything.” 192 Moreover, he was necessarily dependent on global
mobility to conduct his business. Snitching may have been a preemptive mechanism of protecting his mobility and his assets.
On this view, one could posit what might be broadly characterized as
rational choice or welfarist accounts of Umarmutallab’s behavior.
Simply put, on this account, Umarmutallab is a rational utility
maximizer who has decided that he is most likely to maximize his
welfare by snitching on his son. That is, when faced with the prospect
of visa revocation and the potential freezing of his assets if the
authorities suspected that he had provided financial support for his
son’s attempted terrorist attack, he decided that he was simply better
189
190
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off reporting his son. (It is precisely such a view that is reflected in
the quotation from a relative in the preceding paragraph.)
The larger point is that it is helpful to view his behavior through a
game theoretic lens. That is, like the aforementioned Honduran
businesspersons, as a wealthy international banker, the elder Mutallab
may be conceptualized as engaging in a series of repeat-game
arrangements with overseas actors. For example, if Umarmutallab
engages in transnational banking transactions, with intermediary U.S.based banks, these repeat-game arrangements are necessarily
contingent on the cooperation of the U.S. government. Indeed,
Umarmutallab may be quite reasonably conceptualized as engaging in
a series of repeat game arrangements with the U.S. government itself.
The future consequences of non-cooperative behavior may give him
good reason to pre-emptively snitch.
There is a broader point here. Can the U.S. expect network members
to reliably meet their informational sharing function? Utilizing game
theoretic analogies, this Essay contends that the answer will generally
be yes. In a competitive globalized context in which elites value the
access that they have to the U.S., the repeated nature of their
interactions with the U.S. increases the likelihood that they will share
information.
Yet, this recommendation is not dependent on whether elites
"generally" snitch rather than risk withdrawal of their visa privileges.
Using the previous game-theoretic analyses, if a player does not
perceive that she will suffer in the long-term from non-cooperative
behavior with the U.S., she may well defect early in the “game.”
Perhaps her U.S. visa is not particularly valuable, particularly if she
does not believe that U.S. visa revocation will trigger other Western
countries to revoke her other visas. 193 Thus, if a potential snitch has
other valuable visas (such as visas to Canada or the E.U.) which
provide her Western market access and she does not perceive these
visas to be at risk, she may be willing to put her U.S. visa at risk.
193
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Moreover, there are many reasons that she might hesitate to snitch.
She might feel there is not really enough evidence to justify her
suspicions. Moreover, she might fear that the U.S. itself will act
uncooperatively by failing to keep her cooperation confidential. In so
doing undermine, the U.S. would undermine her status in the group or
even provoke her expulsion from the group. She might also have
concerns about the personal safety of family members in her home
country who are not able to travel and as such may be quintessential
“hostages.” 194 Furthermore, even if the consequences are not so
extreme, she might be concerned that community members will
question her motives. Rather than being perceived as honorable, she
might be branded as a U.S. lackey. Moreover, she might remain silent
out of a belief that the U.S. government is very unlikely to discover
that she had this information. Thus the case does not rest on an
acceptance of the prediction that elites will "generally" snitch. It
should be enough to posit that elites will snitch in some significant
number of cases. Whatever that number is, the benefit of this proposal
to the U.S. national interest is considerable, given the terrible potential
toll of even a single terrorist act.

b. Norms-based Motives

Word is, on the streets in Nigeria and abroad, that the name
‘Mutallab’ is now a bonafide word in the English dictionary! As a
noun, it means ’someone who brings shame to his family, to others or
to his country.’ 195
Traditional deterrence theory posits a relationship between the
perceived certainty and severity of legal sanctions and the likelihood
that a rational individual will abide by a rule. Conceptualizing man as
a rational calculator of potential costs and rewards from potential acts,
194
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legal sanctions are viewed as a cost that would accompany a potential
illegal act. Given this view of “rational man,” we should mandate
information sharing and enforce tough penalties to motivate network
members who suspect terrorist activities to share information. Yet,
there is an alternative view. In norm-driven cultures, shame is a
primary mechanism of social control and may be utilized to motivate
persons to share critical information with the government. Indeed, a
less traditional view of effective deterrents (namely successful
disincentives to anti-social behavior) is based primarily on this view of
social control.
For example, the sociologist Dennis Wrong decried the
disproportionate focus on formal sanctions in traditional theories of
deterrence and contended that informal sanctions in the form of social
disapproval were potentially as effective deterrents, since man is
“especially motivated by the desire to achieve a positive image of self
by winning acceptance or status in the eyes of others.” 196 Since
Wrong’s landmark paper, considerable empirical evidence has
emerged from the behavioral sciences to support the notion that the
withdrawal of esteem is an effective mechanism of sanctioning. 197
Wrong’s supplement to traditional deterrence theory proves relevant to
theories of normative deterrence such as the one posited here. Of
course, communal norms do not always reinforce U.S. law
enforcement goals. For example, some communities appear to
celebrate suicide bombing as a legitimate means of political
statement. 198 It would be difficult to stimulate community members to
withdraw esteem as an effective method of sanctioning if the very
behavior that the U.S. is seeking to deter is instead celebrated. 199
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However, this is unlikely to be true of elite communities, which the
sociological literature tells us generally share an inclination to avoid
unwelcome attention. 200 Indeed, although official sanctioning might
play some role in the individual decision-making matrices of
Umarmutallab, a potentially more relevant factor is that his elite
community perceives terrorist violations to be unattractive because
they draw unwanted attention to the community. Under a social
deterrence framework, Umarmutallab’s action may be viewed against
the background of such an elite culture, which prioritizes shame
avoidance and honor restoration. 201
Given this background context, it is perhaps unsurprising that in the
Nigerian blogosphere, the younger Mutallab’s actions were widely
perceived as bringing shame not only to the family, but also to the
nation. One blogger on a popular Nigerian diaspora blog decried the
failure of Nigerian elites to defend their country’s name publicly in the
face of the Obama administration’s decision to put Nigeria on a “high
risk” terror list, 202 declaring, “the Mutallab effect seems to be shutting
us all up. The shame is collectively shared. The collateral damage is
resulting in embarrassment and self-doubt.” 203 As if to extirpate such
shame, a headline in a major Nigerian newspaper appropriated the
words of a Nigerian Minister to capture the sentiments of the entire
country: “[h]e is not one of us.” 204
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ERNEST EMENYONU, NEW DIRECTIONS IN AFRICAN LITERATURE (2006) (noting that
in both Soyinka and Achebe’s texts, the protagonists go to great lengths to extirpate
shame and restore family honor, even by committing ritual suicide).
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A noble view of the older Mutallab’s motives highlights the potential
disgrace to the family name that would, and did, result from his son’s
actions. In anticipation of the monumental blow to the family’s honor,
the father’s decision to snitch might be viewed as a pre-emptive
attempt to restore honor. While the son has sullied the family and the
nation, the elder Mutallab’s actions have been perceived as a valiant
attempt to restore the dignity of his family and the broader Nigerian
society.
It bears emphasizing that these constructs are not peculiar to Nigeria,
and, as such, the broader insight has larger applicability. Shame has
been a historical mechanism of sanctioning in a wide range of cultures
from the Hebrew nation, to indigenous tribal groups on all five
continents. 205 Even biblical prophets were subject to shame when they
transgressed widely understood social rules. 206 The Israelite King
David was shamed repeatedly for committing adultery in violation of
biblical laws, despite his elevated status. David’s narrative is simply a
biblical antecedent to that of the Mutallab family; 207 many societies
have their own Davids. Communal shame-based sanctioning has a
long heritage (and surely a longer heritage than law-based
sanctioning!). 208 Although much has been made of the decline of
shame as an effective mechanism of sanctioning in modern society, in
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many societies, shaming is still an effective mechanism of social
control. 209

c. What are the Implications of a Norms-based Analysis?

Given this background recognition of a shame-based approach to
motivating compliance with legal rules, the U.S. government may be
better served by a soft, as opposed to a heavy-handed approach.
Hence, the focus on visa-revocation. The revocation of such a
privilege, which is typically done privately by the State Department
(and as such, is not a matter of the public record), is a quintessential
“soft” approach.
By articulating a duty to snitch and reinforcing extant communal
norms in a subtle as opposed to heavy-handed manner, the U.S.
government will potentially reduce the likelihood that network
members will fence-sit. The aim is for the government to motivate
network members to signal clearly which side of the fence they fall on.
In so doing, they may even motivate network members to withdraw
esteem from any other network member who had reason to know
valuable information and failed to snitch.
A final point may be in order. The emphasis on norms/communal
based sanctioning derives in part from an appreciation of the clear
differences between the manner in which the state functions in lessdeveloped states such as Nigeria and the traditional understanding of
state function in the Anglo-American legal tradition. In many
developing countries, the state is not a reliable provider of public
goods; it is functionally irrelevant. 210 Rather, the individual will rely
209
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on extended tribal and familial ties for the protection of life, liberty,
and property, and even “public goods” (e.g. roads, public utilities etc.)
will often be provided through extended tribal and familial networks.
In such a context, it becomes particularly important to leverage extant
tribal/communal based norms. Thus, a duty to snitch may be
perceived as an attempt to “nudge” the elder Mutallab off the
proverbial fence to report behavior that is already in violation of
communal-based norms. 211

Part IV: The Dangers
I now turn to discussing a few of the elephants in the room. First,
there are concerns about the dangers of alienating sub-sections of
society that are critical to law-enforcement efforts by placing
affirmative obligations upon them that are not perceived to apply more
broadly to other sections of the society. Second, there is a concern
regarding the McCarthyite implications of imposing a duty to
snitch. 212 Third, there is a concern regarding the dangers of corruption
of the process more generally. Moreover, there may be major due
process and equal protection concerns among immigrants and MuslimAmericans. 213 If these concerns are left unaddressed, Muslim
Conflict States Symposium: Conciliatory Institutions And Constitutional Processes
In Post-Conflict States, 49 WM. AND MARY L. REV. 1213 (2008); Paul Richards,
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Reconstruction in Liberia, and the Case for Modest American Leadership, 17 HARV.
HUM. RTS. J. 207 (2004).
211
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American advocacy groups have argued that such perceived targeting
of communities will undermine intelligence sharing. 214
Writing in the racially charged context of the civil rights movement,
Malcolm X famously warned of the dangers of placing affirmative
duties (i.e. to prevent harm) as opposed to negative duties (simply not
to cause harm) on certain subsections of the society. Malcolm X
argued that the imposition of such obligations on blacks and black
Muslims in particular (even implicitly) threatened to alienate precisely
those portions of the population whose cooperation is critical to law
enforcement efforts.
The applicability of this critique to this proposal is obvious. Indeed,
among public intellectuals, there has been considerable disquiet about
the distinction between “moderate” and “other” Muslims. 215 There
also appears to be an implicit obligation that seems to attach to
Muslims to display their moderate bona fides. 216 To the extent that
this proposal is formulated specifically in response to Al Qaeda’s
penetration of Muslim elites, and might appear to disproportionately
impact Muslim elites, critics might reasonably argue that obligations
are yet again, attaching to Muslims to prove their “moderation” in a
manner that is not expected of non-Muslims. Such actions potentially
undermine faith in law enforcement.
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Moreover, Natapoff 217 has written convincingly of the dangers that an
excessive reliance on snitching will undermine faith in law
enforcement in the context of another community, namely poor
African-American urban communities:
The policy (of disproportionate reliance on snitching)
presupposes a community filled with criminals that need to be
infiltrated in order to be saved. It is a community with reduced
privacy interests in which it is permissible for the state to use
informants to penetrate the most private zones in pursuit of
prosecutorial goals. It is, in essence, a community with
lessened dignitary interests in the eyes of the state . . . (a
community that), is treated as having relinquished some of the
basic rights to privacy and to be let alone. 218
Some of these concerns are unavoidable. Nevertheless, they can be
mitigated. Indeed, it is precisely for this reason that I have taken pains
to emphasize the “soft” nature of the sanctioning for non-compliant
persons. Notably, the Department of Justice has been criticized for
what has been characterized as prosecutorial overreaching in relation
to the communities of terrorist suspects. 219 The concern is that law
enforcement targets community members even when they play no role
in attacks, for unrelated and relatively minor immigration
transgressions, thus undermining the likelihood that communities will
share intelligence with the authorities. 220
Moreover, these
communities are now transnational. 221 If an immigrant is deported for
217
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a minor immigration infraction, she will take the animosity she feels
towards the U.S. back to her community and country of origin, thereby
undermining the likelihood that her broader circle of family and
friends will cooperate with the U.S.
This point is particularly relevant in light of the earlier point about the
distinction between the manner in which the state has traditionally
been conceptualized in the Anglo-American legal tradition, and the
limited utility of the state in developing countries such as Nigeria. If
developing countries are not well-placed to be reliable intelligence
partners, 222 it is especially important to keep the communities within
these countries on the side of the U.S. Hence, the necessity for a more
flexible approach to sanctioning that allows one to leverage these
communal ties.
a. The Dangers of the Imposition of an Affirmative Duty More
Generally

The critique is augmented by the proposal’s imposition of affirmative
duties as opposed to the traditional negative duties on elites. In the
traditional liberal philosophical conception of moral personhood, all
persons are moral agents who have varying moral duties. Yet not all
duties are created equal. That is, there is a moral and conceptual
distinction between affirmative and negative duties. 223
Negative duties restrict actions; they set limits of behaviors that we
may not pursue without infringing on the rights of others. 224 Negative
duties follow from liberalism’s prioritization of individual autonomy
and rights. On a traditional conception of negative moral duties, it
would be understandable if visa-recipients have a duty not to harm.
This proposal however, goes further. Not only do visa-recipients have
222

This may be the case even if the state is well-intentioned; its unreliability
may simply due to its limited reach. Indeed, this point is made particularly well in a
New York Times article on Nigeria’s intelligence failures. Adam Nossiter, Security
Flaws in Nigeria Are Now Drawing Notice, N. Y. TIMES, Jan. 2, 2010, at A10.
223
An accessible summary of the difference between the two types of duties is
H.M. Malm, Directions of Justification in the Negative-Positive Duty Debate, 27
AM. PHIL QUARTERLY 315 (Oct. 1990).
224
Id.

59

a duty not to harm, they have a duty to share such information to
prevent such harm, to the extent that information, which may prevent
terrorist threats is accessible to them. They have an affirmative duty
to take action. Such a duty is bound to be more controversial, because
it arises from an affirmative conception of human obligation.
Although positive duties are more likely understood to hold generally
(that is, we have a general duty to help others), how we fulfill that duty
is typically left up to us. 225 In this proposal, an obligation is imposed
on the individual to help the authorities. The individual appears to
have little say in the matter.
The imposition of affirmative duties is a logical extension of an
emerging consensus (certainly post 9/11) that we have affirmative
obligations to prevent terrorist attacks. We are all familiar with the
injunctions in airports and train stations to report strange behaviors,
strange bags etc. Typically, for American nationals, there are rarely
legal consequences for a failure to report suspicious activity.
However, the same cannot be said for non-citizens. For example, at
least one friend of the would-be Times Square bomber, Shahzad was
deported for a minor visa infraction although he was never charged
and no evidence was presented publicly that he had specific
knowledge of Shahzad’s nefarious activities. 226 The reason for the
deportation was clear. The FBI was clearly sending a message to the
community of Pakistanis. If you suspect something, speak up.
Otherwise, your own visa privileges may later be at risk. Yet while it
was clear that the authorities were sending a message, the FBI refused
to confirm reporters’ suspicions. But why the subterfuge? 227 If as a de
facto (if not de jure) matter, certain aliens are subject to visa225
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revocation for failing to report behavior that the authorities believe
that they had reason to know, shouldn’t DHS be forthright about
precisely what their reporting obligations are?

b. The Dangers of Corruption in Social Networks
In most visa-allocation programs, typically, the number of qualified
applicants will exceed the number of visa slots. Therefore, the
potential rent-seeking problems are apparent. In this particular
proposal, the corruption concern is arguably augmented. How so?
Projects that are reliant on leveraging social networks are particularly
prone to corruption because they are necessarily reliant on friendships
and familial relationships. 228 This project suffers from the same
deficiency that characterizes projects that are similarly reliant on
social networks.
What is the implication of this insight for this proposal? One could
imagine that members of one tribal group may receive preferences not
available to members of another tribal group. The implication of this
is that certain elites may be inclined to receive the benefit of the doubt
with respect to potentially suspicious behavior in relation to other
elites. Thus, repeated travel to Yemen may be perceived as
problematic for members of one elite group but not for members of
another elite group.
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c. McCarthyite Tendencies: Undermining Social Trust
There is also the question of whether the spirit (if not the letter) of the
First Amendment is being breached. 229 Decisions during the Cold War
era to exclude aliens for their associations with suspected American
communists (and implicitly for their unwillingness to “snitch” on these
communists) have withstood judicial scrutiny; it seems clear that we
may set aside constitutional concerns. 230 However, even if we are able
to get around the constitutional questions, aspects of the proposal
rightly offend our deepest moral intuitions.
Indeed, the reliance on a culture of snitching that is reminiscent of the
McCarthy era, in and of itself raises serious concerns. For example,
detailed ethnographic studies of the impact of an informant culture in
East Germany illuminate the dangers of an over-reliance on snitches to
the social fabric of the broader society. 231
With husbands snitching on wives and neighbors snitching on
neighbors, a widespread atmosphere of distrust developed in
the broader society. Indeed, one author described the “indirect
harm” of a widespread societal “malaise” or societal
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“schizophrenia.” 232 In the words of one East German
intellectual, “[t]hese informers determined my life . . . [i]n one
way or another-because they poisoned us with mistrust." 233
A similar culture of suspicion is said to pervade the Palestinian
territories, partly because of the widespread suspicion that Israel is
highly reliant on Palestinian informants. 234 Palestinians who are
perceived to be beneficiaries of elite privileges (such as access to
travel permits) are often the targets of suspicion. 235 Similar stories
also emerge from Northern Ireland, again because of the perceived
reliance of the authorities on informants. 236
Of course, the diffuse utilization of snitches in diverse elite networks
on different continents is not equivalent to the concentrated efforts of
the East German secret police. Yet, one need not go so far to
recognize the dangers to the communities from which the snitches
originate. The effect that the McCarthy era had in cultivating a culture
of suspicion in targeted communities (such as the artistic and academic
Thus, if visa
communities) provides plentiful examples. 237
revocations are too widely utilized, those who retain their visas will
necessarily become the targets of suspicion in their communities (not
unlike the aforementioned Palestinians).
Moreover, the dangers of reliance on informant institutions are
exacerbated because we often cannot know the motives of the persons
who are snitching. In addition to the previously-discussed corruption
problem, there are also dangers of elite capture. 238 Given the highly
232
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competitive nature of some elite networks, consider the following
example. One could imagine that an elite entrepreneur might share
inaccurate information about a competitor in a deliberate effort to
discredit her and even have her removed from the U.S.
Although generally we hope that the persons who come forward to
share information will be “good” types who have sincere concerns
regarding a peer who may be a terrorist threat, there may be either
“bad” types or “mixed” types who proffer information. These would
include individuals who purposely utilize this process to tarnish the
reputation of someone who is not a terrorist threat. They could also
use the process to curry favor with the authorities for their own
purposes, including motivating the authorities to forgive their own
criminal behavior. 239
However, these concerns can be mitigated if it is made clear that
information will not be taken at face value, but rather will be subject to
rigorous verification. The best deterrent to such behavior is to make
clear that individuals may compromise their visa privileges if it later
turns out that they knowingly shared false information for nefarious
motives. The goal is to provide incentives for persons to share
information that they reasonably believe to be troubling, while
providing disincentives for them to share information that they have
good reason to believe is false.

CONCLUSION
In contexts beyond Nigeria, the U.S. may strategically deploy both the
revocation of privilege and this cultural valuation of family honor as a
mechanism for motivating persons to share important information. By
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articulating a duty to snitch, which reinforces communal norms, the
U.S. can nudge the Umarmutallabs of the world in the right direction.
Importantly, the “nudge” should be sufficiently soft so as to be
constructive. Moreover, if communal norms are already working in
the U.S.’s favor, soft sanctions such as a threat of visa-revocation may
be more effective than heavy-handed approaches.
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